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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution grants federal judges and Justices life
tenure “during good Behaviour.”1 However, scholar Erwin Chemerinsky2
advocates for a constitutional amendment that would provide for an
eighteen-year non-renewable term for Supreme Court Justices3 on the
basis that Supreme Court Justices hold too much power and have been
retaining that power for far too long in recent years.4 He further argues
that this proposed amendment is the best way to limit that power while
still maintaining the independence of the Judiciary.
Professor
Chemerinsky’s proposal is that the eighteen-year terms be non-renewable,
so that a vacancy is created every two years, ensuring that no president
will be deprived of the opportunity to make Supreme Court appointments,
and further relieving the Court of the pressures that accompany term
renewal or reelection.5
1

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
This issue has been prevalent for at least several decades in modern times and has
recently come back into the public spotlight as a result of Senator Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas)
open support for a limitation on the Judiciary. Supporters of an eighteen-year term limit
for Supreme Court Justices include such notable figures as Steven G. Calabresi (Professor
of Law, Northwestern University), James Lindgren (Professor of Law, Northwestern
University), and Senator Ted Cruz. Note that Senator Cruz advocates for retention
elections, but has not specifically advocated for the same eighteen-year term that Professors
Chemerinsky, Calabresi, Lindgren, and others support.
3 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ted Cruz is Right: The Supreme Court Needs Term Limits,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 2, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122225/ted-cruz-rightsupreme-court-needs-term-limits (“the best idea is that each justice [sic] should be
appointed for an 18-year, non-renewable term”).
4 See contra THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 at 465–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the Judiciary will always be
the least dangerous of the three branches regarding threats to constitutional rights because
the Judiciary is in the least “capacity to annoy or injure them”). It is also notable that
Professor Chemerinsky is adamantly against giving nine individuals such a vast amount of
power for so long, but he fails to consider that a two-term President will have appointed
four of the nine Justices during his Presidency, the first of whom will leave the bench ten
years after the President leaves office. Under Professor Chemerinsky’s scheme, it is a
guarantee that the President will be exercising power long after he leaves office, as he will
have appointed nearly half the bench for a decade after his term ends. Under the current
appointment scheme, it is certainly a possibility that this could occur, but it seldom does,
and it is not a guarantee in any respect.
5 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 310–12 (Viking, 1st
ed. 2014). It is worth noting that Professor Chemerinsky addresses the possibility of the
death of a sitting Justice by proposing that a vacancy be filled by interim appointment;
however, this creates additional concerns with regard to the level of power that interim
Justice would be able to exercise, the qualifications of the interim Justice, and the interim
Justice’s future once the term concludes. If a sitting Justice were to die with only one year
remaining in his term, it is unclear whether the new interim appointee would serve on the
2
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Although Professors Steven G. Calabresi and James Lindgren set
forth a detailed proposal that would require a constitutional amendment
fixing the number of Justices at nine,6 the idea of appointments occurring
every two years would quickly fall apart if the term limit amendment were
not passed in conjunction with the amendment fixing the number of
Supreme Court Justices. The Constitution grants Congress the ability to
determine how to establish federal courts, which includes discretion as to
how many Justices are to sit on the Court.7 It is much easier for Congress
to pass a legislative act than it is to pass a constitutional amendment; with
this in mind, if the amendment setting a fixed number of Supreme Court
Justices did not pass, the number of Justices could increase or decrease in
the future with less difficulty than passing a constitutional amendment to
this effect. If the number of Justices were to change, the two-year
appointment schedule would be thrown off, and certain Presidents would
have the ability to nominate more Justices than would other Presidents,

Court for one year, eighteen years, or be permitted to serve a second term as a result of
having served such a partial term; from this stems the concern of whether the interim
Justice would be subjected to new nomination and confirmation proceedings, if it would
be implicit that he would serve a second term at the time of his initial appointment, or if he
would be subjected to a retention election, much like those used in many state court
elections. A greater question is presented when it is considered that a Justice could die nine
and one-half years into his term. In such a situation, would the judicial appointment scheme
be similar to the scheme presented for the Executive in the Twenty-Second Amendment,
wherein the interim Justice could serve a second term, only if he has not served for more
than one-half of the deceased’s term (the Twenty-Second Amendment allows a President
to run for reelection only if he has not served more than two years of another President’s
term, so it follows that a Justice may be able to serve a second term only if he has not
served for more than half of another Justice’s term)? If the scheme were similar to that of
the Twenty-Second Amendment, a Justice could theoretically sit on the bench for up to one
day less than twenty-seven years. If any one of these schemes were adopted, it would defeat
one of the primary rationales behind Professor Chemerinsky’s idea. If Justices were
permitted to serve more than eighteen years, regardless of the circumstances, it would only
be a matter of time before the “appointments-every-two-years” scheme were defeated. See
also Calabresi & Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered,
29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006). The authors lay out a far more detailed plan than
Professor Chemerinsky’s and account for complications that may occur if such an
amendment were passed, such as how to handle sitting Justices, phasing in the term limit,
and other similar issues.
6 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 772 (proposing that Congress pass a
constitutional amendment pursuant to Article V “instituting a system of staggered,
eighteen-year term limits,” which would allow every one-term President to appoint two
Justices and every two-term President to appoint four Justices; the authors note that this
scheme would not apply to any of the sitting Justices or any existing nominee at the time
the amendment were ratified).
7 U.S. CONST. art. III § 1 (“the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish”).
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depending upon which Justices’ terms were to conclude within that
Presidency.
This Article will explore the unconstitutionality of such a proposal
by first considering the intent of the Founders in granting life tenure to
Article III judges and Justices, including the ramifications such a proposal
would have on the politics of the Court. The second section will consider
the tenure of past and current Justices to show that there is no historical
basis for such an amendment, as Justices have historically served in excess
of eighteen years. It will also refute the argument that such an amendment
would be similar in nature to the Twenty-Second Amendment, which
provides that the President may only serve two terms. The third section
will confront the separation of powers issues that would result from this
proposal and show how such a scheme would have the effect of
strengthening the already-powerful Legislature at the expense of the
Judiciary. The fourth section will show how this amendment would not
accomplish the intended goal of limiting judicial power, while the final
section will explore how such an amendment would deprive the Court of
its power to decide cases on the merits. The scope of this Article will deal
only with the United States Supreme Court and United States Supreme
Court Justices, unless otherwise noted.
II. TERM LIMIT FOR JUDICIARY EXCLUDED FROM THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE TERM
LIMITS EXPLICITLY INCLUDED
Article II of the United States Constitution explicitly states that the
President shall serve a four-year term;8 Article I states that Senators shall
serve a six-year term,9 and that House Representatives shall serve a twoyear term.10 By including a set period of years for which the President and
congressmen may hold office during any given term, the Founders clearly
contemplated the idea of limiting the power of both the Executive11 and

8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six Years”).
10 Id. at § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year”).
11 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 37, 40–41 (Gaillard Hunt
& James Brown Scott eds., The Lawbook Exchange 1999) (showing the debate during the
Constitutional Convention regarding the Executive and whether he should be elected to a
term of years, how long that term should last, and whether that term should be renewable;
ultimately, there was a majority vote in favor of a seven-year term for the Executive; the
debate included considerations from many delegates regarding how long an appropriate
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Congress,12 and chose to do so.13 Article III, however, simply provides
that “judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour.”14 It is significant that Articles I and II
limit the service of the President and congressmen during any given term
while Article III contains no such restriction on the Judiciary. The
inclusion of a specified term of years in Articles I and II shows the
contemplation of the Founders to limit the power of the Executive15 and
term would last, without giving an individual too much power with no adequate
opportunity for recourse in the event the Executive was unqualified).
12 Id. at 91–92, 94–96 (debating the term for Legislators; Edmund Randolph of
Virginia favored a seven-year term for the Legislature and argued “A firmness &
independence may be the more necessary also in this [Legislative] branch, as it ought to
guard the Constitution ag[ainst] encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form
combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch;” James Madison was likewise
in favor of a seven-year term, as he believed a term of that length would grant stability to
the federal government, which he viewed as a necessity; Madison further supported a
lengthier term by arguing that in “States where the Senates were chosen in the same manner
as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was
found to be no check whatever ag[ainst] the instabilities of the other branches”). This
debate was ongoing throughout the Constitutional Convention until very near the end of
the Convention.
13 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 supra note 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (offering an in-depth
comparison between the powers of the English monarch and the American President to
show where the powers vary and to what degree. This comparison shows a vast reduction
in the powers afforded to the President as opposed to the monarch, and it must be kept in
mind that having been previously ruled by England, the Founders understood the
implication of changing the governmental structure to such a degree.); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 52, supra note 4, at 325–27 (James Madison) (comparing the American House of
Representatives to the British House of Commons to show why the Founders opted to
impose a more regular system of elections and accountability for the Legislature than that
system utilized by the British government; the irregular system of elections for the House
of Commons was flawed, in Madison’s view, as the development of the election scheme
was both ambiguous and discretionary, at various points in its progression); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 53, supra note 4, at 331 (James Madison) (continuing the discussion of
the British Parliament and the flaws that exist therein:
[I]t is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and
uncontrollable . . . They have . . . changed, by legislative acts, some of the
most fundamental articles of the government. They have in particular, on
several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion,
not only introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same
act, continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they
were elected by the people.
The Founders sought to prevent the Legislature from becoming the sort of self-governing,
power-hungry body the British Parliament evolved into, which was one of the primary
reasons for limiting the power of the American Legislature).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
15 MADISON, supra note 11, at 270–71 (providing the debate amongst the Founders
regarding whether to grant the Executive tenure “during good behavior;” Colonel George
Mason found this to be a very dangerous proposition as “during good behavior” was
another term for life tenure, which, in the context of the Executive, was a short step from
a monarch, which was the exact type of government the Founders were trying to avoid; the
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Legislature. However, the exclusion of such a restriction in Article III
shows that, having already contemplated imposing a limitation on both the
Executive and the Legislature, the Founders determined that the Judiciary
was unique and required no such limitation. The Founders clearly felt
empowered to impose a set term on the branches of government, as a
general matter, but opted not to exercise that power in the context of the
Judiciary and instead granted the Judiciary life tenure as opposed to term
appointments.16
The terms set for both the Executive and Legislature show the intent
of the Founders to limit the power of those two branches of government,
most notably the Legislature, which the Founders feared would become
too powerful.17 This fear led the Founders to create a system wherein the
Legislature and Executive would be accountable to the people on a regular
basis.18 However, the life tenure written into Article III shows that the
Founders intended to create a more powerful Judiciary that would not fear
job loss and would not feel the need to cater to the people.19 These
Founders also spent a significant amount of time discussing further the seven-year term
previously agreed upon, whether that term should be upheld, and whether it should be nonrenewable). The Founders’ frequent and lengthy discussions regarding the term of the
Executive and its potentially non-renewable nature exhibit a strong fear against an allpowerful enduring Executive.
16 Id. at 275–78 (debating the salaries of the Judiciary and showing the agreement to
grant life tenure “during good behavior,” with no dissenters; however, it was substantially
debated whether the Judiciary’s salary was to be fixed—the main point of contention was
whether the salary should be subject to be increased by the Legislature during a judge’s
term, or whether the salary should remain absolute throughout a judge’s tenure; ultimately,
the delegates voted that the judicial salary could be subject to increase during a judge’s
tenure).
17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing
the idea that the Judiciary enjoys far less power than the Executive and Legislature because
the Judiciary cannot act unless one—or both—of the other branches acts first. The
Legislature holds the power of the purse and “prescribes the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated,” and the Executive has the ability to determine
which laws to enforce. The Judiciary, however, only has the ability to pass judgment on
the acts of the other two branches and does not hold any power that truly allows it to engage
in original acts of its own. Furthermore, while the Judiciary can pass judgment, it still must
rely on the Executive for enforcement of those judgments and possesses no power of its
own to put into motion the judgments it makes).
18 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (the chief discussion is
of the Executive and how best to ensure that he would be both an independent Executive
while simultaneously maintaining a sense of accountability); THE FEDERALIST NO. 52,
supra note 4 (James Madison) (see supra note 13); THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, supra note 4
(James Madison) (see supra note 13).
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing the
notion that the Judiciary is in constant danger of being overpowered by the other two
branches, which necessitates life tenure as an “indispensable ingredient in its constitution,”
as nothing other than life tenure can so strongly contribute to the Judiciary’s independence
and strength).
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consequences could result from a defined term that would mandate that
Justices either be reappointed at the end of the term or leave the bench.20
A. Politicization of Supreme Court
If the Constitution were to be amended to set a term for which
Justices may serve—even a generous term—the rationale behind Article
III would be lost. The Judiciary would no longer enjoy the power it
currently possesses and would instead feel accountable to the people;
Supreme Court appointments would begin to more closely resemble
elections by virtue of their frequency and predictability, which would
directly contradict Article III. The President and Senate are both
accountable to the people by nature of being elected officials. Because the
President must nominate a Justice and the Senate must confirm the
nominee, if appointments are made that the people disapprove of, the
constituency will retaliate against the elected officials who were
responsible for appointing that Justice to the bench.
Naturally, only those Justices who rule in favor of the popular
views—which may or may not align with the law—would be appointed,
or the Senate and President would face significant backlash and could risk
losing the reelection. As a result, the Judiciary would be accountable to
the people by extension of the frequent appointments with which those
elected officials would have to deal. Were Supreme Court appointments
to become a matter of occurrence every two years, the Senate and
Executive would be forced to make political appointments as opposed to
those appointments that would be best for the Judiciary. If the Executive
and Senate chose not to make appointments for political reasons, those
elected officials would risk losing at reelection. Therefore, Supreme Court
Justices would be chosen for political reasons to an even greater extent
than they are now because the Court, as a whole, would be beholden to the
people by extension of the frequent appointments and the nature of elected
officials.
Such is not the principle behind the Judiciary. The Executive and the
Legislature were intended to be held accountable while the Judiciary was

20

Id. at 471.
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would,
in some way or other, be fatal to [the Judiciary’s] necessary independence. If
the power of making them was committed either to the Executive or
Legislature, there would be a danger of an improper complaisance to the
branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to
hazard the displeasure of either.
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intended as a check on the other two branches.21 If an amendment made
all three branches accountable to the people, the system of checks and
balances the United States holds so dear would fall apart. The system of
checks and balances would instead be replaced by a political arena aimed
at pleasing the voters in the moment, as opposed to upholding the law,
which is the primary purpose of the Judiciary.
Furthermore, elections for members of state judiciaries have shown
that when judges are made accountable to the people, they pledge to decide
cases in a manner consistent with what the people want; this holds true
even when it is impossible to know if cases to support that position will
present themselves during the judge’s time on the court.22 The vast
number of studies on state judicial elections shows that when judges are
up for election or reelection, they pledge to (and do) decide cases in a
manner consistent with the views of their biggest supporters.23
A similarly unfavorable situation would be likely to occur if a new
Supreme Court Justice were appointed every two years. Justices would
feel compelled to show support for the positions of those senators and the
President who supported their appointment out of fear that if the Justices
did not exhibit their appreciation for having been appointed, future Justices
may be appointed who hold different views.24 Those senators and the
President who once supported an individual Justice with certain views may
reconsider their allegiance if that Justice were to threaten the Senator’s or
the President’s ability to win the reelection. As a result, the President and
21 Id. at 467 (arguing that the Judiciary was intended to be an intermediary between
the Legislature and the people in order “to keep the [Legislature] within the limits assigned
to their authority”).
22 Russell S. Sobel & Joshua C. Hall, The Effect of Judicial Selection Processes on
Judicial Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics, 27 CATO J. 69, 70 (2007) (in the 2004 West
Virginia Supreme Court election, “The incumbent, well known for his reputation of
deciding cases for labor interest and against business interests, stressed this reputation in
his media ads, while the challenger outwardly vowed to decide cases in a more business
friendly manner if he were to be elected.”).
23 Id.; Andrew Cohen, An Elected Judge Speaks Out Against Judicial Elections, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/anelected-judge-speaks-out-against-judicial-elections/279263/ (a study conducted by the
American Constitution Society for Law and Policy found that regarding elected state
supreme court justices, “The more campaign contributions from business interests justices
receive, the more likely they are to vote for business litigants . . . a justice who receives
half of his or her contributions from business groups would be expected to vote in favor of
business interests almost two-thirds of the time”).
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing the
belief that periodical appointments, regardless of how such appointments were regulated
or came about, would destroy the independence the Judiciary must necessarily enjoy in
order to do its job properly; Hamilton goes on to argue that “If the power of making [the
periodic appointments] was committed either to the executive or legislature, there would
be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it.”).
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Senators would be more likely to pursue a candidate whose views would
support them come election time, regardless of whether that candidate’s
views would be the most beneficial in upholding the law.25 Likewise,
Justices would feel inclined to return the favor in deciding cases that would
benefit their supporters in order to encourage those same Senators and that
same President to appoint future Justices with similar views.
However, a two-term President’s behavior would likely shift during
his second term, as he would no longer fear reelection. In such a situation,
the President would likely resort to one of two rationales in nominating
individuals: 1) nominees would be chosen to benefit the President’s
political party and gain support for future political candidates of the party;
or 2) nominees would be chosen according to the legal interpretation they
adhere to and the rulings they are likely to make. The mode of thinking
employed by the second-term President would largely depend on his party
allegiance, the national and world climate at the time, and the personal
inclinations of the President toward one rationale over the other.
Interestingly, under Professsor Chemerinsky’s scheme, Justices
would be appointed every two years, which is the same term that a House
Representative enjoys.26 This calls into question whether one of the
motives of the scheme is to make the Senate feel more inclined to adhere
to the whims of the people. If Professor Chemerinsky’s plan were
implemented, Senators would face three Supreme Court appointments per
term. 27 As a result, Senators would feel even greater pressure to form a
Court that is well-liked by their constituency. If three Court appointments
were to occur while a Senator were in office and his or her constituency
were unhappy with the resulting appointments, that Senator would be less
likely to be reelected. This likelihood increases when it is considered that
there would be three more appointments to be made during the following
term, and that Senator had already shown an inability to mold a Court that
is supported by his constituency. While these frequent appointments may
25 See also Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 43,
45 (2003) (presenting the idea of California Governor Gray Davis that when a judge is
faced with “a decision that is contrary to [the Governor’s] position,” “They shouldn’t be a
judge. They should resign. My appointees should reflect my views. They are not there to
be independent agents” (quoting Transcript of Governor’s Comments on Judges,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 29, 2000, at 8.)). While one would hope that United States
Supreme Court Justices would act as independent agents, and Governor Davis’s comments
are likely more on the extreme end of this model of thinking, it is conceivable that similar
viewpoints could manifest themselves in the Executive and the Legislature if Supreme
Court Justices were subject to appointment on a two-year rotation.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year”).
27 Id. at § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six Years”).
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appear beneficial in terms of increasing the accountability of the Senate,
the reality is that the Senate would resort to the appointments that would
help them win the reelection as opposed to those appointments that would
best uphold and interpret the law. Legislative accountability is not bad per
se, but if that accountability comes at the expense of an independent and
qualified Judiciary, it is certainly misplaced.28
In sum, by virtue of having a Court that faces appointments every
two years, the Justices would be far more accountable to the people
because of how this shortened term would influence the elections of those
senators who are responsible for their confirmation.
House
Representatives are elected every two years, which makes them more
accountable to the people than Senators, who are elected every six years.
However, if Justices were appointed every two years, this would increase
the pressure on senators to adhere to the constituency’s influence every
two years—which may or may not be a bad thing, depending on one’s
views—but it would force the Senate into a position more akin to that of
the House of Representatives.
B. The Supreme Court’s Influence on the Appointment Process
In a Nation with a new Supreme Court Justice appointment every two
years, it would be inevitable that sitting Justices would tailor their opinions
to maximize the chances that a like-minded individual would be the next
appointee. An individual Justice only holds power when he or she can
either block a decision or garner enough votes in his or her favor to propel
a decision. The most logical step for a Justice seeking to advance his or
her agenda, then, is to gain the support of as many other Justices as he or
she can; if that means that support can be gained through the appointment
of a new Justice, the sitting Justice will seek to ensure that a certain
nominee secures the appointment. There can be a feeling of fear if the
Court is either too liberal or too conservative. As a result, if a Justice
wishes to secure a conservative appointee on an already right-leaning
Court, that Justice may author opinions that appear to be more on the
liberal end of the spectrum, while still maintaining the holding that he or
she believes to be correct. For example, an opinion authored by a
conservative Justice may not employ the full breadth of traditionalist and
textual interpretations at his or her disposal, but the ultimate holding would
likely be the same as if the Justice had utilized all of the tools typically
involved in reaching a conservative holding.
28 “Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independent judiciary, judges not under
the thumb of other branches of Government, and therefore equipped to administer the law
impartially.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S.
Federal Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006).
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The climate of the Court can influence the nomination process as
much as the political party controlling both the White House and the
Senate. The recent death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia left a
precarious 4-4 balance amongst the remaining Justices,29 leading to
nomination proceedings that were considered to be very high stakes.
Liberal members of the political community expressed fear—or at the very
least, displeasure—at the idea of a right-leaning Court,30 while
conservatives outwardly refused to even consider a left-leaning nominee.
With this in mind, it is conceivable that an individual Justice or group
of Justices could perceive an opportunity to sway the nomination and
confirmation process by manipulating the climate of the Court. Currently,
this is not an overtly prevalent issue because vacancies do not occur on a
set timetable, and unexpected vacancies are even more rare.31 However,
if vacancies were to become as predictable as they would be under
Professor Chemerinsky’s plan, it would be common knowledge eighteen
years in advance which Justice would be the next to vacate the Court,
assuming no Justice were to die while on the bench or choose to leave the
bench early.32
Under this scheme, it would be much easier for Justices to mold the
Court in such a way that an appointee would ascend to the bench whose
views were more in line with the views that the Court—or an individual
Justice—thinks are necessary or desirable at that time, considering the
views of the other sitting Justices. The end result would be that the Court
would feel it necessary to constantly sculpt its own political climate in
hopes of a more politically favorable candidate being appointed at a later
29 Note that Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit was confirmed to the Supreme
Court on April 7, 2017, and is expected to be “a reliable conservative committed to
following the original understanding of the original understanding of those who drafted
and ratified the Constitution.” Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch
Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court Justice, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
30 Adam Liptak, What the Trump Presidency Means for the Supreme Court, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/us/politics/trumpsupreme-court.html?_r=0.
31 See Philip Bump, Antonin Scalia is only the 3rd Supreme Court Justice to die on the
bench in the last 63 years, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/02/13/supreme-court-justicesused-to-often-die-on-the-bench-these-days-its-very-rare/ (discussing the infrequent deaths
of sitting Supreme Court Justices, and noting that Justice Antonin Scalia’s death while on
the bench is only the third since the latter half of the twentieth century; prior to Justice
Scalia’s death, only two sitting Justices had died in the last sixty-six years: Chief Justice
William Rehnquist passed in 2005, while Chief Justice Fred Vinson passed in 1953).
32 See also Eric Hamilton, Note, Politicizing the Supreme Court, STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
35 (2012). The author gives an overview of how the Supreme Court may become more
politicized and the protections the Framers wrote into the Constitution to protect the Court
from such politicization.
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date. Had Justice Scalia been appointed under Professor Chemerinsky’s
plan nearly eighteen years before his death, other members of the Court
would have known that Justice Scalia’s time on the Court would soon end.
As a result, the other conservative members of the Court would have been
likely to author opinions that were more liberal in nature—although still
holding true to what that Justice deemed the appropriate judgment—in
order to create the appearance of a more liberal Court, and thereby
incentivize the replacement of the conservative Justice with another
conservative Justice. At the same time, the liberal Justices on the Court
would have found it beneficial to author more conservative opinions to
give the appearance of a Court that was more conservative than it actually
was, which would have encouraged a more liberal appointee.
The reasoning behind this manipulation sounds in the notion that the
Nation is afraid of having a Court that leans too strongly toward either the
left or the right. In creating a false appearance of conservatism or
liberalism, the Court can encourage the next appointee to be one who
would “balance” the Court. However, this would be an artificial balance
that would be the result of manipulation, as opposed to the true views of
Supreme Court Justices. The Supreme Court decisions would therefore be
based as much, if not more so, on politics and long-term planning than on
what the law requires and what the Constitution reflects. Such
politicization of the Supreme Court would be detrimental to the American
system because the Court would fall victim to the political gamesmanship
that drives the other two branches of the federal government.
III. TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT HAS A BASIS IN THE
ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION, UNLIKE AN
AMENDMENT LIMITING JUDICIAL SERVICE
The Twenty-Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that a President may only serve two terms in office, with an
exception for a partial term in office.33 While the Nation has historically
allowed amendments such as this one, an amendment limiting a Justice’s
time on the bench would be fundamentally different because the TwentySecond Amendment finds its basis within the original Constitution, while
an amendment limiting the Judiciary’s term would not. The TwentySecond Amendment serves to expand upon Article II, which provides that

33

U.S. CONST. amend. 22, § 1.
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and
no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once.
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the President shall serve a four-year term;34 Article III, however, contains
no reference to time with respect to how long members of the federal
Judiciary may serve, or how long a term is to last.35 As a result, an
amendment that would create an eighteen-year term for Supreme Court
Justices would not be expanding on an existing limitation, as the TwentySecond Amendment did.36 Rather, such an amendment would create an
entirely new limitation on the Judiciary that was not meant to exist.37
Article II of the Constitution serves to illustrate and limit the
Executive’s powers, one of which is a limit on how long a President may
serve in any given term.38 This limitation that was written into the
Constitution lends support to the Twenty-Second Amendment because the
Founders clearly intended to use time to constrain the power of whoever
may hold the Presidency, 39 while Supreme Court Justices are merely
limited by their own mortality and “good Behaviour.”40 The Twenty34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”).
35 U.S. CONST. art. III provides for life tenure, which is arguably an unlimited length
of time, subject only to a Justice’s death, compared to the explicit term limits provided for
the Executive and Legislature in Articles I and II, respectively.
36 While some may suggest that Congress could simply pass an act to achieve the result
of a non-renewable eighteen-year term, this proposal forgets that a legislative act cannot
prevail over the text of the Constitution. The Supreme Court frequently strikes down
federal laws on the basis of unconstitutionality; as a result, any endeavor to change the
interpretation of the Constitution must resonate from the Constitution itself, which leaves
only one avenue for change: a constitutional amendment. While that option has been
exercised numerous times, it would not be appropriate in this situation because such an
amendment would be groundless and violative of both Article III and the founding meaning
of Article III, without any historical or textual support within the Constitution. Therefore,
if Congress were to attempt to pass a constitutional amendment to achieve what an act
could not, the amendment would certainly be unconstitutional and inappropriate in the
American Judiciary.
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (the Judiciary
“is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its coordinate
branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence, as
permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable
ingredient in its constitution”).
38 U.S. CONST. art. II (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”).
39 See also MADISON, supra note 11, at 37, 40–41 (George Mason and Gunning
Bedford, Jr. initially suggested that the Executive serve a non-renewable term. Mason
proposed a period of at least seven years, and Bedford countered that this could empower
an unqualified individual for too long with no hope of rectifying the situation, as
impeachment would be inadequate to correct the deficiencies. Bedford’s proposal was to
elect the Executive every three years, who would then be ineligible after a period of nine
years—this scheme is remarkably similar to the one that is currently in practice). Both of
these proposals show an inclination toward not allowing the Executive to hold power for
an indefinite amount of time.
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (as “during good Behaviour” has been interpreted to mean
that the federal Judiciary shall enjoy life tenure, it follows that a Justice shall remain on the
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Second Amendment only served to limit the President’s power further and
thus was a lawful amendment. An amendment limiting the term of a
Supreme Court Justice would not be lawful because the term of a Supreme
Court Justice was not intended to be limited to a term of years originally,
hence the grant of life tenure;41 thus, instead of building on an existing
limitation, as the Twenty-Second Amendment did, such a proposed
amendment would undercut the existing powers of the Judiciary by
imposing a term limit that has no basis within the body of the Constitution.
The Presidency was not originally limited to two four-year terms;
however, the Presidency has always been limited to terms of four years, at
which point the President must face reelection.42 The effect of this fouryear limitation is that Presidents have always been held accountable to the
people on a regular basis, even though the Presidency has not always been
limited by the Twenty-Second Amendment. The federal Judiciary,
however, is different from the Executive in that the Judiciary was not
intended to be held accountable to the people.43 This key difference lends
support to the notion that Justices were intended to be limited only by their
own mortality or by their lack of “good Behaviour.”44
Such an amendment to the judicial power would serve to limit a
power that was intended to be vast, and that was not intended to be limited
by time. As a result, were an amendment regarding the Judiciary’s term

bench until his or her death, should he or she choose to do so. However, it would be error
to argue that a Justice’s term is absolutely without limitation. A Justice’s tenure cannot
outlive his or her physical life, meaning that when a Justice dies, his or her tenure must
cease at that exact moment. As a result, death is a limitation on a Justice’s tenure, just as
the qualifying “during good Behaviour” serves as a limitation on a Justice’s tenure.
However, this limitation cannot be interpreted in the same manner as the limitation on the
Presidency imposed in Article II because a Justice may serve for an indeterminate length
of time and is thus not held accountable to the people; the President, on the other hand, is
explicitly held accountable every four years, thus creating a limitation that may or may not
continue for an additional four years).
41 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that
the protection afforded to the Judiciary by way of life tenure is absolutely vital to the
existence of the Judiciary and the Judiciary’s ability to function independently of the other
two branches of government).
42 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”);
see THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 4, at 416 (supporting the notion that although the
President was not originally limited to two terms, the Founders did wish to differentiate
him from a monarch by requiring him to face reelection every four years in an effort to
hold him accountable to the people).
43 See supra 8–9 (discussing the protections intended for the Judiciary in order to
insulate the Judiciary from public influence).
44 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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to be passed, it would create a new limitation on the federal Judiciary that
was not intended to exist.45
The amendment process is admittedly very difficult to achieve,46
which some may argue supports the notion that the Founders intended to
allow amendments if the proper support could be gained.47 While this may
be true, it cannot be argued that the Founders intended to allow
amendments that would undermine the separation of powers system,
which lies at the heart of the Constitution.48 The Founders expressed
profound concerns regarding the power to amend the Constitution, and
they pointedly debated whether the amendment power would be abused or
manipulated in the future to achieve the government’s ends.49

45

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton).
U.S. CONST. art. V (passing a constitutional amendment requires that the amendment
be proposed by a two-thirds vote in both the House and the Senate then subsequently
ratified by three-fourths of the states; alternatively, an amendment could be passed by way
of a constitutional convention, although this method has never been employed. Passing an
amendment by constitutional convention requires that the Legislatures of two-thirds of the
states call for such a convention, then three-fourths of the states subsequently ratify said
amendment.).
47 Many would argue that had the Founders intended to prohibit certain constitutional
provisions from being amended, they would have written a perpetuity clause into the
Constitution, thereby prohibiting an amendment to said provision. However, such clauses
were uncommon when the Constitution was drafted, and between 1789 and 1944, such
clauses were included in, at most, twenty percent of new constitutions. Richard Albert, The
Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (András Koltay ed.), 14–15 (2015). As a
result, the Founders may not have considered such a provision to be a viable option that
would endure and garner respect in the centuries to follow, given that at the time the
Constitution was drafted, perpetuity clauses were so seldom included.
48 See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 4, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton)
(suggesting that the Legislature should not amend the Constitution when a majority of the
constituents “momentar[ily]” wishes to do so, if that amendment would be inconsistent
with “the existing Constitution”); see also MADISON, supra note 11, at 571–72 (detailing
the debate over the power to amend the Constitution, as well as the concerns of many that
this power was too vast and would be subject to abuse; Colonel George Mason was
expressly concerned that the government would manipulate this power so as to prevent the
people from amending the Constitution in truly essential ways and, as a result, become
oppressive).
49 MADISON, supra note 11, at 573–77 (George Mason expressed the concern that in
granting the amendment power, “no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained
by the people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would
be the case”).
46
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A. Passing Judgment on a Federal Constitutional Amendment Would be
Akin to Passing Judgment on a State Constitutional Amendment
The power of the Supreme Court allows it to pass judgment on the
constitutionality of laws and state constitutions;50 it follows that the
Supreme Court could likewise pass judgment on the validity of a federal
constitutional amendment, and such a judgment would not be
fundamentally different from passing judgment on a state constitution and
rendering a state constitutional amendment invalid.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has only passed
judgment on state constitutions, never the federal Constitution. The
Supremacy Clause certainly allows the federal Constitution to overrule
any state laws or constitutions that may be in conflict with the federal
Constitution, which provides a strong foundation for challenges to state
constitutions.51 When looking at the role state constitutions play in the
United States, they can be considered to be the smaller-scale counterparts
to the federal Constitution in the sense that state constitutions are the
ultimate governing law for that respective state, much like the United
States Constitution is the ultimate governing law for the United States. It
follows that state constitutional amendments are the smaller-scale
counterparts to federal constitutional amendments. Importantly, the
federal Constitution always trumps state constitutions. However, even
with this in mind, if the federal Judiciary has the authority to render part
of a state constitution null and void due to contrary ideas between the state
constitution and the federal Constitution, it is not implausible that the
Supreme Court would have the authority to render a constitutional
amendment null and void due to inconsistency with the body of the
Constitution.
Typically, when two laws are in conflict, the law that was passed
later in time wins the day. However, if an amendment were passed that
seemed to negate one of the founding principles of the federal Judiciary,
the amendment may be regarded differently than an ordinary law, as laws
do not tend to alter the very foundation of the United States. If this were
to occur, it could be argued that the established Constitution—which has
been in existence for more than 225 years—takes precedence over an
amendment that seeks to rid the Constitution of one of its protective
elements because the very purpose of the Constitution is to uphold the
50 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (ruling that an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution was invalid because the amendment was inconsistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in this Constitution
or the Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
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United States as a nation. If any type of legislation, constitutional
amendment or otherwise, seeks to impose on that purpose, the Constitution
should win out in order to protect the Nation.
B. Constitutional Moments and Other Methods of Effecting
Constitutional Change
Until 1940, no President had both sought and won a third presidential
term.52 In 1795, George Washington set the precedent that established a
two-term limit on the presidency; no President successfully broke this
tradition until 1940, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was
elected to a third term in office. For nearly a century and a half, America
abided by an unwritten rule that dictated that Presidents could only serve
two terms; this rule became law in 1951 with the ratification of the
Twenty-Second Amendment.53
Professor David A. Strauss argues that the formal amendment
process frequently has no bearing on constitutional changes, and that such
changes occur, absent a constitutional amendment, as a result of other
factors.54 Professor Strauss further argues that absent an amendment or
legislation to effect change, “Deep, enduring changes in society will find
some way to establish themselves with or without a formal
amendment . . . through changes in private behavior.”55 For nearly 150
years Presidents served only two terms, which is arguably a “Deep,
enduring change” in American society from the monarchy of England.56
52 THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40864, PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND
TENURE: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 7-5700 (2009) at 1 (“While [the twoterm tradition was] generally honored as sacrosanct until . . . 1940 . . . no fewer than four
19th and 20th century Presidents before President Franklin Roosevelt were tempted to seek
a third term.”).
53 Id. at 10 (explaining that within two years of President Roosevelt’s death, the
Twenty-Second Amendment had been proposed and was subsequently ratified in 1951).
54 David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457, 1458–59 (2001) (“through most of our history, the amendment process has not
been an important means of constitutional change . . . . On the contrary, the forces that
bring about constitutional change work their will almost irrespective of whether and how
the text of the Constitution has changed”).
55 Id. at 1464.
56 Contra id. at 1493 (although I find Professor Strauss’s idea of a “Deep enduring
change” clearly applicable to the situation of a two-term President, Strauss, while admitting
that this is a plausible view, argues that the Twenty-Second Amendment was necessary to
effect change because of the effects that accompany the mandate that a President vacate
the office after two terms, such as the effect of a lame duck President. Professor Strauss is
likely correct in his assertion that the Twenty-Second Amendment was essential in creating
some of the phenomena that exist today, however, the argument that a “Deep enduring
change” took effect prior to the ratification of the Twenty-Second Amendment holds strong
with regard to the idea as a whole. My argument does not rest on the idea that the TwentySecond Amendment was absolutely vital to create every effect that exists today; rather my
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Although the limit was not constitutionally mandated until 1951, it can be
argued that the two-term limit had already been dictated and had already
taken effect in America because it had been in place for so long.57 The
behavior of past Presidents in not pursuing—or pursuing unsuccessfully—
a third term solidified this idea, and the Twenty-Second Amendment
served only to formally constitutionalize what had already been accepted
by American society.
The idea of a dualist democracy, set forth by Professor Bruce
Ackerman, argues that change can be effected either through ordinary
political discourse, meaning that government makes decisions, or through
the People, which is a less frequently used method to effect change, due to
the difficulty of accomplishing change via this avenue.58 In the latter
method, an extraordinary number of citizens must come to care about the
movement and determine to support the idea, and the citizens must
repeatedly decide to support this initiative, or this method will be
ineffective.59 When such a movement has been effective, Professor
Ackerman argues that a constitutional moment has occurred that results in
a constitutional amendment as a result of the collective outcry of the
People.60
The public support of a few select scholars and politicians in favor
of limiting judicial tenure is not a constitutional moment. It lacks the
characteristics shared by other constitutional moments that did effect
change; nowhere in the dialogue is an assertion that limiting judicial tenure
has gained widespread support or necessity. The other significant
constitutional moments have all been characterized by necessity, in order
for the country to endure on, and widespread—though not universal—
argument relies only on the proposition that the Twenty-Second Amendment merely served
to codify what had already been in practice with respect to the tradition of a President
serving two terms; any other effects that followed the Twenty-Second Amendment are
merely ancillary to my argument).
57 Id. at 1459 (explaining that on certain occasions, “when amendments are adopted,
they often do no more than ratify changes that have already taken place in society without
the help of an amendment”).
58 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6–7 (1991) (explaining that
governmental decision-making occurs on a daily basis, but the people can only take charge
of the democracy “if they succeed in mobilizing their fellow citizens and gaining their
repeated support in response to their opponents’ counterattacks,” at which point the
citizenry can “proclaim that the People have changed their mind and have given their
government new marching orders”).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 51–55 (President Roosevelt’s successful constitutional moment in rejecting
the Article V transformative process and instead garnering public support to pass the New
Deal is in stark contrast to President Reagan’s failed constitutional moment wherein
President Reagan unsuccessfully attempted to gain popular support for his critique of the
welfare initiatives that accompanied the New Deal).
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support for the movement that eventually resulted in a constitutional
amendment or series of amendments.
The three established constitutional moments, the Foundation of the
country, the Reconstruction Era, and the New Deal61 were all characterized
by necessity. Had the Bill of Rights not been insisted upon and
subsequently passed, the Constitution likely would not have been ratified.
Had the North not protested slavery and had the Civil War not ensued, the
Fourteenth Amendment would not have been passed. Had the Roosevelt
administration not sought the much-needed economic reform, the New
Deal would have been nonexistent. Each of the results from these events
is characterized by necessity. None of these amendments or legislation
would have become law had they not been absolutely necessary for the
continued existence of the United States. An amendment limiting judicial
tenure is not necessary. It will not ensure the continued presence of the
United States, nor will it ensure the continued presence of the United
States in its current form. Such an amendment would modify the United
States and would place it in no better a position of enduring strength than
the Nation is currently in without such an amendment.
Likewise, each of the three constitutional moments noted above were
marked by widespread support. Both the passage of the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment were a result of multiple states requiring some
sort of constitutional amendment. The New Deal had the support of most
of the Nation, as the Nation was in the midst of an economic crisis and
needed salvation.
The proposal to amend Article III, however, does not have the same
degree of support as any of these three events. While it is true the proposed
amendment is once again back in the spotlight, it is in the spotlight based
on the prominence of its supporters, not the sheer number of its supporters.
Not all great changes in American history have been backed by a large
number of supporters—such as the Constitutional Convention, arguably—
but those events that endure as constitutional moments have substantial
support by virtue of the vast number of Americans seeking to support that
idea.62 This proposed amendment lacks the requisite support to be
considered a constitutional moment.63 It is neither necessary nor is it
61 Id. at 41, 57 (“lawyers and judges are right to look upon the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as decisive moments at which deep changes in popular
opinion gained authoritative constitutional recognition”).
62 Id. at 6 (in order to successfully pass a “law in the name of the People, a movement’s
political partisans must, first, convince an extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to
take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to
politics”).
63 Id. at 6–7 (describing the characteristics of changes that are effected by the People
and have enough enduring popular support to be considered constitutional moments).
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supported in the same fashion as a constitutional moment and it is
fundamentally different from events such as the Constitutional
Convention; as a result, it cannot properly be considered a constitutional
moment and thereby gain legitimacy.
C. The Practices Outlined in the Twenty-Second Amendment Were in
Practice for 150 Years Before the Limitation Was Constitutionalized
The citizenry backed two-term presidencies for nearly 150 years,
beginning with President George Washington’s refusal to serve more than
two terms. Since that time, Americans supported the idea that no President
would serve for more than two terms and repeatedly renewed this
commitment, as Professor Ackerman argues is necessary for change to
occur through the People.64 While it could be argued that this commitment
was abandoned with the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a temporary
departure from the commitment was necessary, as the following section
will show. Prior to President Roosevelt’s four terms, the citizens made a
commitment to two-term presidencies that endured for nearly 150 years
and maintained that commitment until extraordinary circumstances
mandated that the citizens take alternative action for the preservation of
the Nation.
Admittedly, the Twenty-Second Amendment was not proposed until
after President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been elected to serve a fourth
term, which was cut short by his death.65 However, the political climate
and world events during President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency
were unique from those of Presidents past, and the events warranted an
exception to the unofficial rule.
In 1929, America was struck by the Great Depression,66 and the
Nation did not fully recover to pre-Depression growth patterns until
1942,67 at which point, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was already well
into his third term. Had Roosevelt chosen not to seek a third term in 1940,
he would have left the Nation in a precarious position, as the world had
recently plunged into the Second World War, and America was still

64 Professor Ackerman argues that in order for the People to effect change, Americans
must support the proposal “time and again” until such change is effected. Id. at 6.
65 NEALE, supra note 52, at 10 (explaining that fewer than three months after beginning
his fourth term in office, President Roosevelt died from a cerebral hemorrhage on April 12,
1945).
66 Christina D. Romer, The Nation in Depression, 7. J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 19, 21
(1993) (showing that the American construction industry began plummeting in 1929,
which signaled the beginning of the Great Depression).
67 Id. at 35 (discussing the recovery of the American economy following the Great
Depression).
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attempting to recover from the decade-long Depression.68 Any change in
administration in 1941 would have left America vulnerable because any
ripple at that time would have made the country more prone to attack,69
and the possibility exists that the economic recovery that Roosevelt put in
place may not have continued under a different administration.
Similarly, when Roosevelt was again reelected in 1944, the United
States was in the midst of World War II. Although the War ended shortly
after Roosevelt’s death, at the time of his reelection in 1944, the German
and Japanese forces had yet to surrender and continued to pose a serious
threat as the Holocaust continued.70
It is unclear if America would have accepted third and fourth terms
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the Great Depression and World
War II not posed such significant threats during his administration and
during the election years in question. However, the presidency set forth
by President Roosevelt was unique in that it fell during a time of
turbulence, the magnitude of which has seldom been seen in America.
These extenuating circumstances created an exception to the
unofficial “two-term rule” created by President George Washington
because of the danger that would have accompanied even a minor shift at
the time of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s reelections.71 As a result,
Professor Strauss’s idea that tradition and behavior can modify the
Constitution still stands. This idea is bolstered by the notion that the
68 Interestingly, at the time Roosevelt was nominated for a third term, many of his
critics attacked the third term by claiming he was seeking to violate a “tradition”
established by President George Washington. Third Term? Or First Term?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1940 at E1. However, some claimed that such a third term “‘would upset an
unwritten part of the American Constitution.’” George Gallup, Ebb and Flow of the ThirdTerm Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1940 at 108.
69 Notably, even without a significant change, the Japanese still successfully bombed
Pearl Harbor in 1941. Had America seen a change in its political climate, the country would
have been more vulnerable than it was simply because changes are almost never seamless.
70 Michelle Hall, By the Numbers: End of World War II, CNN (Sep. 2, 2013, 4:05 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/btn-end-of-wwii/ (Germany surrendered on May
8, 1945, and the Japanese surrendered on September 2, 1945; World War II did not
officially end until the Japanese surrendered).
71 Though beyond the scope of this Article, an interesting consideration is whether the
two-term limit ever became unofficially constitutionalized and if so, at what point? While
Washington began the trend of a two-term Presidency, it would be difficult to argue that
he single-handedly established this trend as a constitutional mandate. The Constitution is
crafted in a way that a single individual cannot affect a constitutional amendment; however,
Roosevelt, as the thirty-second President was the first to successfully pursue a third—and
subsequently, a fourth—term. The question then becomes, at some point between
Washington’s Presidency and Roosevelt’s was a constitutional amendment effected and
did Roosevelt fail to abide by that amendment? If such an amendment was created by these
unofficial means, at what point did it garner enough support to actually be considered an
amendment?
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Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified in 1951, shortly after
Roosevelt’s death. The ratification following so quickly on the heels of
President Roosevelt’s death shows that the country already considered two
terms to be the standard, and the Nation wanted to make it clear that what
was already considered to be the unofficial rule was to become law.
D. Supreme Court Justices Have Not Been Serving Eighteen-Year
Terms for Any Notable Period of Time
While the Twenty-Second Amendment found much of its validity in
the historical practice of Presidents serving no more than two terms, there
is no such practice amongst the Supreme Court Justices of historically
remaining on the bench for no more than eighteen years.72 In applying
Professor Strauss’s idea that a “Deep, enduring change” can effect an
amendment,73 it is clear that such a change existed with respect to the
Twenty-Second Amendment and the nearly 150 years of precedent on the
matter. However, the data shows that for nearly fifty years, the average
tenure on the Court has been more than twenty-six years;74 the argument
that a shorter judicial term has already manifested itself within the Court
and within society based on data prior to the mid-twentieth century shatters
when considered alongside the more recent data.75 If this pattern of
Supreme Court Justices remaining on the Court for fewer than eighteen
years had been a “Deep, enduring change”76 of the same nature as two-

72 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 778 (while the authors attempt to argue that
Supreme Court tenure “has increased considerably since the Court’s creation in 1789,” the
authors seem to be looking only at select datasets; when comparing the data beginning in
the year 1821—a mere thirty-two years after the creation of the Court—with the most
recent dataset, the difference in Supreme Court tenure shows a change of only 5.2 years,
which is not the “astonishing” increase the authors would like to portray); David R. Stras
& Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors
Calabresi & Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007).
73 See Strauss, supra note 54.
74 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 778 (the data, as portrayed by Professors
Calabresi and Lindgren, shows that since 1970, the average length of Supreme Court tenure
has been 26.1 years).
75 Id. The authors analyze the statistical nature of Supreme Court Justices with regard
to the amount of time spent on the Court for each period of roughly thirty years, spanning
from 1789 to 2006.
76 Strauss, supra note 54, at 1458–59 (asserting that “The changes produce the
amendment, rather than the other way around;” however, it is impossible to argue that the
change in favor of eighteen-year non-renewable terms is in the process of effecting a
constitutional amendment because such a change is not apparent, regardless of how the
data is considered; furthermore, there was no trend in favor of moving toward such an
amendment prior to 1970 because if there had been, the change would have been so rooted
in the culture of the Supreme Court that the Justices would have stepped down following a
single eighteen-year term; however, the Court clearly moved toward longer terms instead
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term presidencies, Justices would not have controverted this policy by
choosing to collectively remain on the Court for such a lengthier period of
time.
Many prominent scholars argue that the Founders did not intend for
Justices to serve for several decades, as they do in the present era.77 As
Professors Calabresi and Lindgren point out, advances in technology,
medicine, and changes related to politics and perceptions of the Judiciary
have motivated the tenure of Supreme Court Justices to lengthen to a
degree.78 However, the data compiled by Professors Calabresi and
Lindgren contradict the idea that the Founders did not intend for the
average tenure to extend as it does today.79
The average tenure between 1821 and 1850, according to Professors
Calabresi and Lindgren, was 20.8 years, while the average tenure between
1971 and 2000 was 26.1 years.80 Considering that in the time period
beginning only thirty-two years after the ratification of the Constitution,
Justices were already serving for more than two decades, on average, it is
difficult to believe that the Founders did not foresee a tenure of this
duration. Furthermore, over 150 years, the average tenure of a Supreme
Court Justice increased by little more than five years, while the average
life expectancy over the same time period has increased by at least thirty
years.81 This showing of the dramatic increase in life expectancy, coupled
of shortening the collective tenure, which shows that no change or trend toward an
amendment has been effected within the body of the Court).
77 Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 5, at 772 (however, the authors neglect the fact
that according to their own data, Justices were serving for more than twenty years just
thirty-two years after the Court was created—given the short timespan during which the
Court was constituted and Justices started serving for decades, it seems senseless to say
that the Founders did not foresee and did not intend such a result when granting tenure
“during good Behaviour”).
78 Id. at 777 (“Americans have experienced drastic changes in medicine, technology,
politics, and social perceptions of judges”).
79 See Stras & Scott, supra note 72. Professors Stras and Scott deconstruct Calabresi
and Lindgren’s claims that life tenure is “fundamentally flawed,” and that increases in
Supreme Court tenure have been “astonishing” and “unprecedented.” Id. at 792–93.
80 Id. at 778.
81 Clayne Pope, Adult Mortality in America Before 1900: A View from Family
Histories, in STRATEGIC FACTORS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN ECONOMIC
HISTORY: A VOLUME TO HONOR ROBERT W. FOGEL 267, 280 (Claudia Goldin & Hugh
Rockoff eds., 1992) (showing that for birth periods 1760 through 1799, the average life
expectancy at age twenty was 43.5 years for men and 44.2 years for women; for the time
period from 1800 through 1819, the average life expectancy was 43.4 years for men and
42.5 years for women); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65
Years of Age, and at 75 Years of Age, by Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years 1900–
2007, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2010/022.pdf (last visited July 4, 2016) (showing
that the average life expectancy for a male born in 2007 is 75.4 years while for a woman
born in the same year, the average life expectancy is 80.4 years). The data shows that over
the past two centuries, the average life expectancy for women has increased by at least 36.2
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with the short increase in average tenure, dispenses with the idea that the
increase in life expectancy has encouraged Justices to remain on the bench
longer; rather, the increased life expectancy seems to have encouraged
Justices to serve for a slightly longer period of time, but retire from the
bench rather than die while on the bench.82
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES WOULD BE IMPLICATED
IN EXPANDING THE LEGISLATURE’S POWER THROUGH
SUPREME COURT TERM LIMITS: TAKING POWER FROM THE
JUDICIARY WOULD FURTHER EMPOWER THE LEGISLATURE
In effect, if the Legislature were successful in passing an amendment
limiting the Judiciary’s term, this transformation would redefine the role
of the Judiciary and would empower the Legislature far more than the
Founders intended.83 If the Legislature succeeded in passing such an
amendment, the Legislature would be taking power away from the
Judiciary and would instead reserve that power for itself. By its very
nature, if the Legislature finds within its own power the ability to limit that
of another branch beyond the constitutional mandates, the Legislature has
expanded the power it was given.
Currently, the Judiciary holds the power to determine its own term.
A Justice can leave the bench when he sees fit for whatever reason he or
she may choose; in exceptional circumstances, a Justice may be
impeached, but this situation seldom occurs.84 However, if an amendment
were passed that imposed a set term for Justices, the Court’s members
would no longer have the power to determine the duration of each of their
own terms. The Legislature would have full power to decide, at the
passage of the amendment, how long a Justice should be permitted to
serve. That power has time immemorial been reserved to the Court, and
it would contravene the set boundaries of the Legislature’s power to
allocate it to any other body.

years when considering the data conservatively, while the male life expectancy has shown
an increase of thirty-two years, again when considering the data conservatively.
82 See Bump, supra note 31 (explaining that Justice Antonin Scalia is only the third
Justice to die on the bench since the latter half of the twentieth century; prior to Justice
Scalia’s death, Chief Justice William Rehnquist died while sitting on the bench in 2005
and Chief Justice Fred Vinson died in 1953).
83 MADISON, supra note 11, at 282–88 (arguing that it is a fundamental principle that
the separation of powers system be maintained and that it is just as fundamental that each
branch exercise its own powers without invasion from the other two branches).
84 Richard B. Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 49, 49 (1960).
The only Supreme Court Justice to be impeached in American history is Associate Justice
Samuel Chase, who was impeached in 1805 and later acquitted by the United States Senate.
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Regardless of whether there is a finite amount of power that must be
divvied up between the three branches, the nature of determining term
limits for the Judiciary dictates that this power cannot be shared by two
branches simultaneously. Professor Charles Geyh asserts that the life
tenure granted to Article III judges and Justices is a form of “doctrinal
independence,” in that it is granted in the text of the Constitution.85
Professor Geyh goes on to briefly discuss what may be considered a threat
to doctrinal independence, and it follows from his examples that an
amendment revoking life tenure would be such a threat.86
Although the Appointments Clause87 provides minimal guidance, at
best, as to how Supreme Court Justices are to come by their appointments,
the current method of appointing Supreme Court Justices involves a
nomination by the President once a vacancy presents itself, followed by
confirmation by a simple majority in the Senate.88 Thereafter, the newly
confirmed Justice remains on the bench either until he or she chooses to
retire, or dies on the bench. However, were the proposed eighteen-year
term limit to become a constitutional amendment, the President’s power
to appoint Justices would be diluted because his appointees would no
85 Charles Gardner Geyh, The State of the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of
America’s Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence, 82 IND. L.J. 1215, 1217 (2007) (“a
federal judge’s tenure during good behavior is explicitly guaranteed by Article III of the
U.S. Constitution and is thus a matter of doctrinal independence”).
86 Id. n.13 (explaining that a bill, “which proposed not only to strip the federal courts
of jurisdiction . . . but to disregard a judicial order, thereby arguably encroaching on
judicial power and violating the separation of powers” would threaten doctrinal
independence (citing Bill Ruthhart, Sodrel: Prayer Measure Fights “Judicial Activism,”
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22, 2006, at B6)).
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme court”). Note that the
Advice and Consent Clause is frequently criticized as being one of the most ambiguous
phrases in the Constitution, as it sets out no method by which the Senate is to give its
“Advice and Consent,” nor does it give any semblance of a clue as to how strongly
weighted the Senate’s “Advice and Consent” should be.
88 While there is no rule explicitly dictating how many votes are necessary to confirm
a Justice, the cloture rule provides that a simple majority vote in the Senate is necessary to
defeat a filibuster. Prior to invocation of the nuclear option to change Senate Rule XXII as
it applies to Supreme Court nominees, a three-fifths vote of the entire Senate was necessary
to defeat a filibuster; however, this rule died in order to allow the confirmation of nowJustice Neil Gorsuch. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to
Clear Path for Gorsuch, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html. A nominee cannot be
approved if an ongoing filibuster does not come to an end; therefore, in order for a
nomination to even come to a vote, fifty-one senators must vote to end the filibuster—
voting to end the filibuster in order to bring the nomination to a vote is closely related to
voting on the nomination itself because if a favorable nominee can garner enough support
to defeat a filibuster, he or she is likely to receive enough votes to earn the appointment.
Conversely, if the filibuster is never called to an end, the Senate will never vote on the
nominee, and he or she will not receive the appointment.
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longer remain on the bench until either retirement or death, but would
rather be forced to leave the bench after eighteen years.
The current practice allows a President’s legacy to live on
indefinitely, as there is no measurable way to predict when a Justice will
leave the bench—this has become a primary method of exercising the
Presidential power in a way that allows the political ideologies of that
President to outlast his Presidency.89 If this were to change, not only
would the political balance shift moving forward, but the Legislature
would succeed in grasping a portion of the Executive’s power that is
considered to be of primary importance in creating a lasting impression on
the Nation. Furthermore, the Founders saw fit to grant the appointment
power to the President, knowing that Supreme Court Justices had been
granted life tenure; were the President to be deprived of his power to
appoint Justices for life (and thereby exercise his power beyond his
Presidential term), the Legislature would violate Article II of the
Constitution. As a result, such an amendment would not only be
unconstitutional in terms of Article III, but it would be unconstitutional in
terms of Article II, as it would deprive the President of one of his
constitutionally granted powers.
When a branch of government loses a portion of its independence,
that independence must go somewhere—there must be some reason why
that independence has been lost, and the power associated with that
independence likewise must resurface elsewhere, unless a power is
abolished in its entirety. If life tenure were removed from the Constitution,
the power of a Justice to determine his or her own term would not be
abolished entirely; rather, that power would transfer to the Legislature,
were the amendment at issue to be formally introduced in Congress and
subsequently passed. It would be incorrect to argue that this power would
cease to exist because some entity must determine a Justice’s term—
currently, a Justice determines his or her own term; if no party were
responsible for determining a Justice’s term, Justices would have to remain
on the bench in perpetuity, which, realistically speaking, means until
death. This is not a practical proposition due to the uncertainty and
political battles that ensue following a sitting Justice’s death, and this
would not be conducive to an effective Judiciary.90
89 Just as some may argue that Supreme Court Justices have been holding too much
power for too long and accountability is warranted, some may also argue that allowing a
President’s legacy to live on in the Court for decades after he leaves office is allowing the
Executive to exercise too much power from beyond the Oval Office.
90 Consider Justice Antonin Scalia’s recent death. Justice Scalia died roughly nine
months before the 2016 presidential election, resulting in a slew of politically fueled
statements and arguments. Prior to confirmation of Judge Gorsuch, the Court was
comprised of eight Justices, which was problematic as cases were permitted to be decided
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As this power would not be abolished in its entirety, it must vest
elsewhere and would no longer reside with the Judiciary. The Legislature
is responsible for constitutional amendments and, although it acts at the
behest of the people, the Legislature itself is considered to retain those
rights associated with legislation. Therefore, if an amendment were
passed that took away from the Judiciary the ability to determine its own
terms, that power must go to the Legislature because the Legislature is the
body responsible for passing amendments and setting the specific terms of
those amendments. As a result, if the Legislature were to pass an
amendment reducing life tenure to a single eighteen-year term, the
Legislature would intentionally be taking away one of the foundational
powers of the Judiciary, and immediately reserving for itself the ability to
exercise that power.
V. EVEN IF SUCH AN AMENDMENT WERE LAWFUL, IT WOULD
NOT ACCOMPLISH THE GOAL OF LIMITING JUDICIAL POWER
Those who favor an amendment limiting the term for Supreme Court
Justices are not attacking the power wielded by individual members of the
Judiciary for an extensive period of time. They are attacking the idea of
nine very well known people sitting on the highest Court in the country,
gaining notoriety, and making decisions that are unpopular with at least
one side. If the amendment’s supporters were actually attacking the power
held by the Judiciary, those supporters would be calling for a complete
reform of Article III tenure as opposed to reform for just the Supreme
Court.

without a majority for more than one year, consequently allowing circuit court decisions
to stand on issues important enough that they warranted Supreme Court review.
Furthermore, it takes time to nominate and confirm a Justice—albeit, it may not be much
time under ordinary circumstances, but the Court cannot cease to function during the time
in which it lacks a full Court. Finally, Justice Scalia’s death gives a nice preview of the
situation of a Justice’s death in an election year, but the implications could be far more
dramatic if a sitting Justice were to die closer to an election. Were that to happen, the 2016
political atmosphere surrounding the next appointee would pale in comparison to the
situation of a Justice dying within one or two months of an election taking place. If the
Executive were to change hands and shift to the opposing political party as a result of a
Presidential election, there is a good possibility that midnight appointments could occur
with respect to empty Supreme Court appointments, provided the Senate were willing to
cooperate with the departing President.
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A. Circuit Court Supremacy
Many circuit courts hold a vast amount of power—in some
situations, just as much power as the Supreme Court.91 The Supreme
Court is unable to hear the vast majority of cases in which a petition for
certiorari is filed.92 However, there are certain types of cases that the
Supreme Court is more likely to take than others; it is known that the
Supreme Court is more likely to grant certiorari in a case that exhibits a
circuit split. 93 If an important case presents itself to a Circuit Court that
the circuit judge believes warrants Supreme Court review, the circuit judge
will likely be inclined to decide the case in a manner that increases the
chances that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to hear that case and
thereby create binding precedent.94 As judges frequently employ strategy
in their decisions, it is reasonable to believe that this strategy plays a role
in deciding a case with respect to the potential for Supreme Court review.
There are certain issues that affect the entire Nation and are more
appropriate for Supreme Court review than circuit review.95 Knowing that
the Supreme Court is unable to hear every case presented, judges use their
insight into the certiorari-granting process to decide those few important
91 When the Supreme Court declines to hear cases in a certain legal field for a number
of years, or in situations wherein there is no majority holding, the circuit court’s decision
stands, often for a great length of time, until the Supreme Court determines to hear a similar
case and successfully reaches a majority holding on the issue. See Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Ass’n., 578 U.S. ___ (2016) (holding was a 4-4 split decision, following the death
of Justice Scalia; such a split meant that the Supreme Court did not reach a majority
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below would stand as governing law).
92 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1
(last visited May 19, 2017) (the Supreme Court is only able to accept roughly two percent
of the cases it is asked to hear each year).
93 H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 246–52 (1991) (showing that the existence of a circuit split is perhaps the
most “important generalizable factor” in determining whether to grant certiorari. Note that
the entirety of chapter eight is dedicated to “Certworthiness” and discusses the factors that
are most relevant in granting certiorari as well as those factors that tend to immediately
disqualify a case from being one of the few the Supreme Court determines to hear).
94 Id. at 251 (suggesting that when there is a known circuit split and jurisdiction would
be proper in multiple circuits, litigants may find it wiser to file a case in a circuit that lacks
favorable precedent, if doing so means that the Supreme Court is likely to hear the case on
appeal. A litigant can thereby increase his or her chances of appealing the case to the
Supreme Court and allowing the Court to create binding precedent). Litigants are not the
only parties who are able to take advantage of such a strategy. It is a short leap to reason
that judges may employ this same insight into the certiorari-granting process in order to
take advantage of an opportunity to allow the Supreme Court to create binding precedent
in an area that may not otherwise be ripe for Supreme Court review for years, if ever.
95 Enduring issues and those issues that are far-reaching, such as gay marriage, are
more appropriate for disposition by the highest Court than for final disposition by an
intermediate court.
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cases in a manner that increases the likelihood that the Supreme Court will
take the case, such as by creating a circuit split
In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the Court failed to
reach a majority decision, meaning that the Ninth Circuit’s decision would
stand as the governing law.96 While there is no definitive way to ascertain
how long the Ninth Circuit’s decision will stand, this outcome is
noteworthy because it shows that the Ninth Circuit is effectively
exercising the power of the Supreme Court by virtue of asserting the
holding in a case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In granting certiorari, the Court asserts its power to hear and decide
cases. However, when the Court fails to decide a case, a decision must
come from somewhere—the current practice for allowing cases like
Friedrichs to be decided is by allowing the lower court’s decision to stand.
When this occurs, the lower court assumes the power of the Supreme Court
that the Court exercised by granting certiorari. Although the Court’s entire
power does not exist in its ability to grant or deny certiorari, a significant
portion of the Court’s power vests in this ability. Therefore, when the
Court exercises this power then subsequently allows a lower court’s
decision to stand for lack of a majority holding, the Supreme Court is
thereby allowing this power to subsume in the lower court.
Consider also the situation wherein the Supreme Court lacks
quorum.97 When a quorum does not exist to hear a case, the Chief Justice
may order a case remitted to the appellate court that heard the case below
so that a decision may be issued.98 Although it is infrequent for such a
case to present itself, the Court to grant certiorari, then subsequently be
unable to hear the case for lack of quorum,99 this was the situation

96 Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–57095, 2014 WL 10076847 (9th
Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam) (the Supreme Court’s
opinion read, in its entirety “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”).
97 A quorum is six Justices. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (1948).
98 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1948).
If a case brought to the Supreme Court by direct appeal from a district court
cannot be heard and determined because of the absence of a quorum of
qualified justices, the Chief Justice of the United States may order it remitted
to the court of appeals for the circuit including the district in which the case
arose.
99 See LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT: SUPREME COURT
RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 80–83 (2016) (identifying only one case—Alcoa—in
which certiorari was actually granted, but later left undecided by the Supreme Court for
want of quorum). However, Professor Louis Virelli identifies several cases in which the
Court simply determined not to a hear a case for lack of quorum—each case wherein the
Court denied certiorari solely because it lacked quorum is a situation that prevented the
Court from exercising the fullest extent of its power, and thereby leaving no choice but to
allow a lower decision to stand, even if the Court did not desire to effect such a result.
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presented in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa).100
As a result, the case was ultimately heard and decided by the Second
Circuit, whose decision has not been overturned by the Supreme Court.
Because the Supreme Court could not attain a quorum, it expressly
transferred its power to a lower court because the Supreme Court ventured
to take a case that it was later unable to decide. The end result was that
the Supreme Court exercised the option to allow a lower court to absorb
its power for the purpose of deciding Alcoa, which was important enough
to warrant a grant of certiorari.
In effect, the Second Circuit sat in place of the Supreme Court.
Although the Second Circuit’s decision is not binding on all other circuit
courts in the same way that a Supreme Court decision would be, this case
is still widely considered good law and is a landmark case in the antitrust
arena. Even though the Second Circuit did not absorb the entirety of the
Supreme Court’s power for the purpose of deciding Alcoa, the Second
Circuit absorbed whatever power is associated with the Supreme Court’s
ability to determine a case. As this decision has stood for more than
seventy years and is recognized almost exclusively as the leading decision
on the issue therein presented,101 it could be suggested that the Second
Circuit’s decision holds nearly the same weight as a Supreme Court
decision would have because lower courts rarely seek to hold in opposition
to Alcoa.
Judge Learned Hand was one of the three judges who presided over
Alcoa; although he never gained a seat on the Supreme Court,102 Judge
Hand is one of the most influential jurists in American history, and his
teachings live on today.103 Judge Learned Hand’s tenure on the Second

100 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 320 U.S. 708 (1943) (having previously
granted certiorari, four Justices subsequently disqualified themselves, rendering the Court
unable to determine the case; as a result, the Court transferred the case to a special docket
and postponed hearing the case until such time as quorum was attained—such quorum was
never reached); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 716 (1944) (deciding to
transfer the case to the Second Circuit, as a quorum was still lacking); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945) (proceeding with final disposition of the case
and determining that Alcoa had, in fact, engaged in anticompetitive practices).
101 See contra United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672 (2004) (rejecting
portions of the Second Circuit’s holding in Alcoa).
102 He was nominated for a Supreme Court seat twice and was rejected both times.
103 Mark M. Arkin, “The Tenth Justice:” A Review of Learned Hand by Gerald
Gunther,
12
THE
NEW
CRITERION
75
(2016)
(available
at
https://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/-ldquo-The-Tenth-Justice-rdquo—4964)
(reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994)) (when
asked which Supreme Court Justice was the “greatest living American jurist,” Justice
Benjamin Cardozo stated, “‘The greatest living American jurist isn’t on the Supreme
Court’ He was, of course, referring to Learned Hand”).
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Circuit Court of Appeals endured for thirty-seven years104—longer than
the longest-serving Supreme Court Justice.105 Judge Thomas Swan, who
also presided over Alcoa, served on the Second Circuit for thirty-eight
years,106 while Judge Augustus N. Hand sat on the bench for twenty-seven
years.107
Given that both Judges Learned Hand and Thomas Swan served
longer than any Supreme Court Justice,108 and only one current Justice has
served longer than Judge Augustus Hand served,109 it must be questioned
what critics of life tenure for the Supreme Court are really criticizing.
These three judges presided over and decided a vast number of cases,
many of which are still controlling decades after these judges left the
bench. They held an extreme amount of power for an extended period of
time, and their influences are still highly regarded and frequently
controlling. Yet, even though these three judges served on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and exercised arguably more power than many
Justices have—and quite possibly more than any Justice could exercise in
eighteen years—those who advocate for an eighteen-year term only
suggest such a term for the Supreme Court, not for the lower federal courts
that are often subject to judges like Learned Hand, Thomas Swan, and
Augustus Hand.
These scenarios, wherein a circuit court exercises a substantial
amount of the Supreme Court’s power and judges serve on circuit courts
longer than any Supreme Court Justice, serve to support the proposition
that those who seek to impose a limited tenure on Supreme Court Justices
really are not attacking the power wielded by the Court for an extended
period of time. If the supporters of such an amendment were truly opposed
to such a great amount of power residing with a few individuals for an

104

Id.
Justice William O. Douglas served on the Supreme Court for thirty-six years, which
is the longest tenure for any Supreme Court Justice to date. William O. Douglas, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_o_douglas (last visited May 19, 2017).
106 Judge Swan retired from full service and took senior status for his last twelve years
on the bench. Second Cir. Hist. and Commemorative Events Committee, Special
Supplement: Colleagues for Justice: One Hundred Years of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L.R. 937, 939 (1991).
107 Judge Augustus Hand took senior status for his final year on the bench. Id.
108 Justice Douglas was the longest serving Supreme Court Justice. William O. Douglas,
OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/william_o_douglas (last visited May 19, 2017).
109 Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has served as an Associate Justice for twenty-nine
years to date, three years longer than Judge Augustus Hand served. At the time of his death,
Justice Antonin Scalia had been on the bench for twenty-nine years as well. Members of
the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited May 12, 2017).
105
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extended period of time, they would attack all Article III judges, not just
Supreme Court Justices.
B. Shortening Supreme Court Tenure Will Not Lessen Judicial Power
Those who support an eighteen-year term are of the opinion that
shortening the term of a Supreme Court Justice will lessen his or her
power. However, those who support such an amendment fail to recognize
the power that will continue to vest in the former Justice, once he or she
leaves the Supreme Court bench, if he or she takes a seat on a lower court.
As shown above, circuit courts can hold incredible amounts of power and
the same judges can sit together for decades. If Article III is amended to
allow for a single eighteen-year term on the Supreme Court, followed by
the option to maintain life tenure on a lower court, it is possible that a
circuit court could be composed entirely, or almost entirely, of former
Supreme Court Justices. Were this to occur, the federal Judiciary would
essentially have a Supreme Court and an unofficial supreme court at the
lower level, composed exclusively of those whose time had run out at the
Supreme Court level.
Those former Justices serving on circuit courts would be accorded a
greater level of respect than those circuit judges who never served on the
Supreme Court simply because if one attains the title of Supreme Court
Justice, his or her opinion on legal matters is typically given more weight
by virtue of his or her experience with the highest Court. As a result, the
decisions rendered by former Justices, while not possessing the same
binding effect as Supreme Court issued decisions, would likely carry more
influence than a decision written by a judge who had never sat on the
Supreme Court. This would create a tiered effect in the federal Judiciary
wherein district judges would be the least powerful members of the federal
Judiciary, ordinary circuit judges would hold more power than district
judges, but less power than former Justices, and current Supreme Court
Justices would hold marginally more power than their counterparts whose
tenure had expired.
Because the Supreme Court takes so few cases each year, this tiered
system could lead plaintiffs to file cases in a jurisdiction where every
circuit judge is a former Justice. Such strategic legal maneuvering would
allow a party to appeal a trial court’s decision to a court whose decision is
likely to be influential for years to come. While it is always possible that
the circuit court’s decision could be appealed to and overturned by the
Supreme Court, filing in a jurisdiction where a party is guaranteed an
appeal to an incredibly influential court is dangerous. This maneuvering
would thus eliminate a key component of the Supreme Court in its ability
to grant or deny certiorari. Not all cases are worthy of appeal to the
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Supreme Court, and some cases contain issues that the Supreme Court
does not see fit to weigh in on at that point in time.
However, if a circuit court were to be composed entirely of former
Justices whose opinions are highly regarded, a party who lost at the trial
level in that circuit would be guaranteed an appeal to that circuit court.
This would force a court that is more powerful than any current circuit
court to hear cases and create precedent on issues that may not be
appropriate for such strong precedent at that time.110 This is one of the key
reasons behind the power to grant or deny certiorari—it is dangerous to
force courts holding that magnitude of power to hear certain cases.111
Furthermore, the Supreme Court could be less inclined to take cases
heard by a circuit court constituted almost entirely of former Justices. As
stated above, such a court would hold enough power that its decisions
would be highly regarded and would be extremely persuasive authority,
where those decisions were not binding. As a result, the Supreme Court
would frequently not see fit to expend judicial resources on cases decided
by such a circuit court, unless the Supreme Court intended to overturn the
decision, because of the highly influential nature of the circuit court’s
decision. With a heavy docket, the Supreme Court cannot afford to spend
time hearing and deciding cases just to affirm the decision of a court whose

110 See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (suggesting that
twenty-five years after this landmark affirmative action holding, such affirmative action
would no longer be necessary to ensure educational equality). Although the Court granted
certiorari in Grutter and subsequently rendered an opinion, the Court expressly stated that
it anticipated that its holding would become obsolete within twenty-five years; however,
at the time this case presented itself, the Court found it inappropriate to strike down the
type of affirmative action scheme presented therein. The importance lies in the
acknowledgement that this holding would not endure, and was not intended to endure
indefinitely; rather, this holding was intended to endure only so long as it was necessary—
in effect, the Court intended its Grutter decision to stand only so long as the political and
social climate regarding equal opportunities in education remained unchanged. Once the
climate changed, the Court intended for the law to change with that climate. The notion
that underscores this holding is that the Grutter Court understood that affirmative action
should not be the law indefinitely, but at the time Grutter presented itself, America was not
in a position to accept an educational system that lacked affirmative action. As a result, the
Court deferred striking down affirmative action until such time when it was no longer
needed from either a political or social standpoint.
111 See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law
Principles, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2011) (asserting that the Judiciary Act of 1891
was originally intended, largely, to give the Court the discretionary power of certiorari in
order to ease the workload of the overburdened Court). However, the power to grant or
deny certiorari has evolved to the point where it is now considered of vital importance to
the Court in terms of regulating its decisions based on political and social ideologies of the
time. Note also that the Judiciary Act of 1891 created discretionary review of cases, which
implies that Congress intended for the Court to use its best judgment, in whatever form it
may take, in deciding which cases are ripe for review.
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power is only marginally lesser than its own and whose decision would
likely stand for years to come, even absent Supreme Court review.
It is doubtful that such an “unofficial Supreme Court” at the circuit
level would have the effect of easing the true Supreme Court’s workload
since the Supreme Court currently accepts only up to roughly two percent
of the cases it is asked to review in any given year.112 Such a low
acceptance rate could indicate either: the Court refuses to accept the other
thousands of cases for reasons other than time and resource constraints; or
the Court simply lacks time and resources to hear all of these cases. It is
possible that the Court has a political, ideological, or legal reason for
refusing to accept each of the cases it is asked to review, but in light of the
state of the Judiciary as a whole, the more likely reason is that the Court
simply does not have enough time or resources to hear each case and issue
a decision. As an abundance of cases would likely warrant review if the
Supreme Court were able to hear them, those cases that would otherwise
go unheard would likely take the place of cases reviewed by the circuit
court composed almost entirely of former Justices. The end result would
be more cases being heard by a powerful court, but no less of a burden on
the Supreme Court.
It could benefit America if more issues were heard by a court whose
presence were similar to that of the Supreme Court, but the issue still exists
as to the right to appellate review and the notion that not all issues should
be heard by a court whose power approaches that of the Supreme Court.
It would be more dangerous to allow these issues to reach a court of this
power than it would be to continue the status quo wherein only a small
percentage of arguably important issues are considered and decided by the
Supreme Court. Forcing the creation of powerful precedent could have
unintended consequences, whereas declining to create powerful precedent
carries with it the consequence of situations remaining stagnant. Precedent
is more difficult to overturn at a later time than the stagnancy from a
declination to decide a case. Therefore, if one must decide between
creating undesirable precedent and refusing to take any action at all,
resulting in the continuation of a negative situation, he or she should
choose the latter, or he or she will risk not being able to undo the
undesirable precedent at a later date. Hence, the Court has the power of
certiorari, which allows it to exercise judgment in determining which
cases should not be decided by a court possessing such a great degree of
112 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1
(last visited May 19, 2017) (the Supreme Court accepts roughly 100 to 150 “of the more
than 7,000 cases that it is asked to review each year,” which equates to roughly two percent,
when calculated conservatively).
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power; however, if a circuit court were composed almost entirely of
former Justices, this power of certiorari would diminish and precedent that
otherwise would not have been created could come into existence.
VI. “POLITICAL LIBERTY” AND DEPRIVATION OF THE POWER
TO DECIDE CASES ON THE MERITS
With Marbury v. Madison, the Court found within Article III the
power of the Supreme Court to decide cases, and to do so on the merits of
those cases.113 For more than two hundred years the Supreme Court has
exercised this power, and this power has become fundamental to the
American Judiciary—if the Court did not have the power to decide cases
on the merits, or if it uniformly opted not to exercise that power, the Nation
would have no meaningful court of last resort.114 However, were the term
limit proposal to become a formal constitutional amendment, its legality
would undoubtedly be challenged and the Supreme Court would be faced
with the question of whether such an amendment is unconstitutional. If
presented with this situation, the Court would be deprived of its
fundamental power to decide cases on the merits, as the Court would have
no real choice but to determine the case on any grounds other than the
merits. Hence, the passage of such an amendment would not only be
unconstitutional in its own right, but it would unconstitutionally deprive
the Supreme Court of the power it has exercised since Marbury.115

113 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803). In determining the outcome of this
case, the Court made a bold move in asserting its power to not only act as a court
empowered to determine cases in controversy, but also to decide those cases on the merits;
by finding that deliverance of a commission is not necessary for an officer to actually take
office, the Court decided the case on the merits as opposed to procedural grounds, which
it easily could have done, thereby avoiding the issue of whether William Marbury was
entitled to the commission as of right; note that although the Court determined that
Marbury was entitled to the commission, Marbury ultimately lost the case on jurisdictional
grounds.
114 If the Court were to decline to decide any cases on the merits, the only true course
of action an appellant would have would be to find some procedural flaw in the proceedings
below, and appeal on those bases. However, this presents a problem when it is considered
that the Supreme Court is responsible for reconciling circuit splits, those issues that come
before it based on original jurisdiction, and other substantive matters that the courts below
incorrectly decide. A meritorious Supreme Court is fundamental to the United States
Judiciary because without such a Court, there would be no body responsible for ensuring
that laws and the Constitution are carried out uniformly throughout the country—each
state, territory, and circuit would operate under its own interpretation of the Constitution
and federal laws, which would create a disjointed Nation.
115 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138 (determining that the Supreme Court holds the power to
determine cases on the merits).
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The Supreme Court’s authority derives from public confidence in the
Court.116 Such confidence will only sustain as long as the public believes
in the Court and believes that the Court is acting out of concern for the
Nation as a whole; if the Court were to strike down an amendment limiting
Justices to a single eighteen-year term, the public perception would be that
the Court is protecting itself and its own interests, as opposed to the
interests of the public. This is not a viable option for the Court to pursue
because the moment it finds in its own favor, a large portion of the public
will view the result as nothing more than a self-serving holding that lacks
a basis in Supreme Court precedent. The effect would not be such as to
maintain the power the Court has exercised for more than two hundred
years, as intended; rather, by holding to maintain the status quo, the true
effect would be to lessen the Court’s power by lessening public confidence
in the Court. The Court’s authority is a direct result of public confidence;
therefore, if public confidence in the Court lessens, the authority of the
Court will lessen as well.
Conversely, if the Court were to uphold such an amendment, it would
severely curtail its own power in a way that the Supreme Court is unlikely
to do—practically speaking, the Supreme Court, which is currently
composed of four Justices who have served in excess of eighteen years,117
is unlikely to find that as of the eighteen-year mark, each Justice
individually becomes incapable of rendering coherent decisions or is no
longer fit to sit on the Court, simply by virtue of having served for just shy
of two decades. The likelihood of the Court turning to historical precedent
with regard to Supreme Court tenure is remarkable and upon such
findings—as well as the inherent nature of the Court—it is highly unlikely
that the Supreme Court would actually see fit to lessen its own power in
this way.
Neither of the two potential scenarios that could result from a
decision on the merits would be practical or beneficial when considering
the effects either decision could have. If this case were to present itself,
the Court’s analysis would reveal that deciding the case on the merits is
not a true option because doing so would be detrimental to the Court to the
extent that its power would diminish in a way that it may never recover
from. As a result, the Court would not decide the case on the merits;

116 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence”).
117 Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 19, 2017)
(Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G.
Breyer have served on the Supreme Court in excess of eighteen years).
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instead, the Court would seek an alternative way to dispose of the case
gracefully,118 in order to maintain both public confidence and the power it
has properly exercised since Marbury.
Such an amendment would effectively deprive the Supreme Court of
the power to decide cases on the merits. By placing the Supreme Court in
a position where it must decide whether to uphold its constitutionally
granted power or preserve the public confidence that gives life to its
decisions, the Court is being asked to make a choice between either giving
up a significant amount of its power or giving up the confidence that gives
its power meaning.119 Such a choice is no choice at all, but is actually an
attempt to coerce the Supreme Court into holding that Article III does not
create the Supreme Court that the Marbury Court found to exist.120
The Supreme Court cannot afford to make this decision. In
considering the cost-benefit analysis, the Court would certainly find the
costs of deciding on the merits to severely outweigh the benefits. The
ultimate effect would be that Congress would force the Court to forgo a
portion of the power it has traditionally exercised since Marbury; under
the separation of powers scheme, Congress is not empowered to lessen the
Court’s authority in this way.121 The result would be an unconstitutional
seizure of power from the Supreme Court by Congress. 122 As the
Legislature is the most powerful branch and the Judiciary is the least
powerful branch,123 such a seizure cannot be tolerated.124
118 Such disposition could find the Court reaching its holding on procedural or standing
grounds, or the like, in order to avoid the essential question.
119 See generally 1 CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., rev. vol. 1914) at 161, 163 (“Political liberty is to be
found . . . only when there is no abuse of power . . . . Again, there is no liberty, if the
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive”). Although
Montesquieu argues for separation of the Judiciary from the Legislature out of fear that the
Judiciary would become abusive if it possessed both powers, it must be remembered that
Montesquieu considered the Judiciary to be the least powerful branch. Id. at 167. It follows
that Montesquieu was more concerned with the power the Legislature would bring to the
Judiciary than with the power the Judiciary would bring to the Legislature. If the
Legislature forces the Supreme Court to give up a portion of its power for lack of alternative
options, the Legislature will invade the realm of the Judiciary and “political liberty” will
necessarily suffer.
120 See, Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138.
121 Although this is an interesting argument, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
122 MADISON, supra note 11, at 282–88 (arguing that it is imperative that each branch
exercise its own powers without intrusion from either of the other two branches).
123 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 119, at 167 (when discussing the interactions between the
Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary, Montesquieu posits “Of the three powers
mentioned above, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing”).
124 Consider also that the Judiciary is intended as a check on the Legislature. If the
Legislature can be permitted to take the Supreme Court’s power in a way that is not allowed
for in the Constitution, the balance of power would become even more skewed and the
Judiciary would quickly cease to have any meaningful existence.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The proposal that Supreme Court Justices be subjected to a single,
non-renewable eighteen-year term would violate Article III of the United
States Constitution, and such an amendment would find no constitutional
basis outside of Article III. The Founders intended to construct the
Judiciary in a different manner than the Executive and the Legislature, in
part by granting Article III judges life tenure. To do away with this
fundamental principle would be to eliminate one of the key protections
afforded to the Supreme Court that enables it to perform its duties free
from excessive political interference. Even absent the Founders’ intent,
there is no basis for such an amendment, as there is no standing tradition
of eighteen-year terms, and there are no dire circumstances that mandate
a break from the tradition of Justices determining their own terms.
Furthermore, such an amendment could have the unintended consequence
of forcing an overly powerful circuit court to issue opinions creating
precedent that should not be created and that would be detrimental to the
welfare of the Nation as a whole. In short, were such an amendment to be
passed, the Nation could face its first instance of an unconstitutional
constitutional amendment.

